Abstract. Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those that advocate the "1/2 view" and those that advocate the "1/3 view." One source of disagreement between advocates of different views concerns the evidential relevance of self-locating information. Unlike halfers, thirders regard self-locating information as evidentially relevant in the Sleeping Beauty
Introduction
The Sleeping Beauty Problem (SBP) is a challenging puzzle in probabilistic reasoning. It raises questions of unsuspected theoretical relevance for the foundations of probabilistic reasoning, belief update, decision-making, and beyond (Titelbaum, 2013) .
In its standard formulation, the problem goes as follows:
On a Sunday, some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either once or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once; Tails: twice). After each waking, they will put you back to sleep with a drug that makes you forget that waking.
When you are awakened, to what degree ought you believe that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads? (Elga, 2000; see Piccione & Rubinstein, 1997 Example 5 for the original formulation)
Opinions on this puzzle are split between two camps. For so-called halfers, your credence in Heads should be 1/2 on the probability scale. At the outset, you know all the details of the experiment, including that the coin is fair and that you will lose your memory of an earlier awakening. When you wake up, all new information you have is the self-locating information 'I am awake now.' Selflocating information (aka 'centred information') concerns one's spatio-temporal location in the world or one's identity-such as the information 'Today is Monday or Tuesday,' or 'I am Jun.'
Instead, non-self-locating information (aka 'uncentred information') -such as the information 'The coin landed Tails' or 'Jun was born in Nanjing' -concerns what the world is like. Self-locating information bears no relevant connection to the outcome of the coin flip, according to the halfer.
Since before the experiment you know that the coin is fair, you should then retain a credence of P(Heads) = P(Tails) = 1/2 (Lewis, 2001; Arntzenius, 2002; Cozic, 2011; Hawley, 2013) .
So-called thirders disagree and submit that your credence in heads should be 1/3. The pair {It is now Monday} and {It is now Tuesday} partitions your space of centred possibilities. When you wake up, the pieces of information on which you can rely are 'I am awake and it is now Monday' and 'I am awake and it is now Tuesday.' Since these pieces of information are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive, you may have three distinct self-locating beliefs:
H1: It is now Monday and the fair coin landed Heads. T1: It is now Monday and the fair coin landed Tails.
3 T2: It is now Tuesday and the fair coin landed Tails.
By the law of total probability, it follows that P(Heads) = P(Heads | It is now Monday) x P(It is now Monday) + P(Heads | It is now Tuesday) x P(It is now Tuesday) = 1/2 x 2/3 + 0 x 1/3 = 1/3. Your credences should then be P(Heads) = 1/3 and P(Tails) = 2/3 on any particular awakening (Elga, 2000; Dorr, 2002; Weintraub, 2004; Titelbaum, 2008) .
Disagreement on SBP persists, partly because it is unclear whether or not self-locating information is evidentially relevant to credences about uncentred hypotheses. Thirders believe that learning new self-locating information in the SBP impacts your credences about the outcome of the coin flip (e.g., Horgan 2004; Weintraub 2004; Titelbaum 2008; Draper 2013) . Halfers believe that selflocating information is evidentially irrelevant to uncentred hypotheses; and so it has no evidential impact on your credences about the outcome of the coinflip (e.g., Lewis 2001; White 2006; Bradley 2012; Hawley 2013 ).
Epistemologists and philosophers of science have developed several probabilistic explications of the concept of evidential relevance (Fitelson 1999; Crupi 2015) . One way of evaluating the adequacy of these alternative explications is to examine their degree of similarity to ordinary usage and judgment (Carnap 1950; Kemeny & Oppenheim 1952) . To the extent that an explication will only illuminate a concept if it fits central cases of ordinary usage and judgment, empirical results from the psychology of reasoning bear on philosophical questions about the evidential relevance of self-locating information in the SBP (cf., Schupbach 2015; Colombo 2016; Tentori et al. 2007) . Psychological results will provide philosophers with data helpful to discover and assess instances of concept pluralism underlying an explication; they can help philosophers to identify the explicandum's central features and their relation with other concepts; and they can point to sources of bias affecting philosophers' judgments about such an unusual case as the SBP (Shepherd & Justus 2014) .
With the studies reported here, we bring Sleeping Beauty to the lab for the first time, so as to gain a more nuanced understanding of the evidential impact of self-locating information. Our results indicate that an adequate explication of the evidential relevance of self-locating information should take into account that self-locating information may trigger more cautious judgments of confirmation than familiar kinds of statistical evidence.
Overview of the experimental scenarios
For our study, we adapted the standard SBP to make it as transparent as possible to naïve participants, as follows.
BASIC version
On a Sunday, you will be administered one of two pills, depending on the toss of a fair coin (HEADS: regular pill; TAILS: strong pill). You will not be told the outcome of the coin toss, and the two pills look identical.
However, you know the following.
If the coin landed HEADS:
-the pill you're given on Sunday (regular pill) will make you sleep for one day;
-then you will wake up (on Monday).
If the coin landed TAILS:
-the pill you're given on Sunday (strong pill) will make you sleep for one day;
-then you will wake up a first time (on Monday), and shortly afterwards fall back asleep for another day, forgetting that you just woke up; -then you will finally wake up a second time (on Tuesday).
Imagine you've just woken up. You don't know which day it is, and you do not know whether or not you have already woken up before. You are now asked to express your belief about the outcome of the coin toss that was made on Sunday.
As anticipated, the halfer's and thirder's predictions diverge critically in this basic version.
According the thirder, one should judge P(Heads) = 1/3 and P(Tails) = 2/3. According to halfer, instead, the correct answer here is P(Heads) = P(Tails) = ½, just as in the following No Evidence version, which we employed as a control condition.
NO EVIDENCE version
[same introductory paragraph as above]
If the coin landed HEADS:
If the coin landed TAILS:
-the pill you're given on Sunday (strong pill) will make you sleep for two days; Imagine you've just woken up. You don't know which day it is. You are now asked to express your belief about the outcome of the coin toss that was made on Sunday.
As P(Heads) = P(Tails) = ½ is uncontroversially the correct response in this version, participants' judgments should differ between the Basic vs. No Evidence condition in case they reason as thirders and self-locating information has impact on their credences. In order to gain a more fine grained understanding of the evidential impact of self-locating information, and further disentangle halfers' and thirders' predictions, we relied on yet another benchmark variant, where ordinary (non-self-locating) and evidentially relevant information was involved.
MARBLE version
On a Sunday, five small, empty, and closed boxes are placed in front of you; and you will then be administered one of two pills, depending on the toss of a fair coin (HEADS: regular pill; TAILS: strong pill).
You will not be told the outcome of the coin toss, and the two pills look identical. However, you know the following.
If the coin landed HEADS:
-the pill you're given on Sunday (regular pill) will make you sleep for one day; -meanwhile, one of the five boxes will be filled with a marble, then closed again (the other four boxes remain closed and empty); -then you will wake up (on Monday), and open one of the five boxes at random.
If the coin landed TAILS:
-the pill you're given on Sunday (strong pill) will make you sleep for two days; -meanwhile, all five boxes will be filled with five marbles (one each), then closed again; -then you will wake up (on Tuesday), and open one of the five boxes at random.
Imagine you've just woken up. You don't know which day it is. You open one of the five boxes at random: you find a marble. You are now asked to express your belief about the outcome of the coin toss that was made on Sunday.
Like in the No Evidence version, the halfer's and the thirder's analyses converge in this case, because P(Tails) = 5/6 (computed as (1*1/2) / [(1*1/2) + (1/5 * 1/2)]). Instead, they critically diverge as concerns the comparison with the following counterpart version:
PLUS version
If the coin landed HEADS:
If the coin landed TAILS:
-then you will wake up a first time (on Monday), and shortly afterwards fall back asleep for another day, forgetting that you just woke up;
-the same will happen on each of the following days, until you finally wake up a fifth time (on Friday).
Imagine you've just woken up. You don't know which day it is, and you do not know whether or not you have already woken up any time before. You are now asked to express your belief about the outcome of the coin toss that was made on Sunday.
The Plus version tries out the halfer's intuition further. According to the halfer, the switch from two to five awakenings (or ten, for that matters) would still leave the self-locating evidence irrelevant, so that judgments in the Plus condition are expected to differ from the Marble In summary, we experimentally manipulated the SBP's formulation as a function of the kind of evidence available to human reasoners (Table 1) . We thereby addressed three questions with our study: whether human reasoners acknowledge self-locating information as evidentially relevant in the SBP, whether the impact of self-locating information differs from the impact of objective statistical information like finding a marble in a randomly chosen box, and whether the standard halfer and thirder accounts are empirically adequate.
Study 1
Method. Two hundred and forty-one participants (Mean age, 35, SD = 10, male 137, female 104)
were recruited using Amazon MTurk. We only allowed MTurk workers with an approval rate > 95%
and with a number of HITs approved > 5000 to participate in our study. Instructions and material were presented in English on the Qualtrics Survey Software. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups, and none took part in more than one experiment.
As pointed out above, four conditions were sufficient to disentangle relevant predictions from standard halfer and thirder accounts, thus putting them to empirical test. Halfers and thirders agree on their predictions that P(Tails) = 1/2 in the No Evidence condition, and that P(Tails) = 5/6 in the Marble condition. For the Basic and Plus conditions, instead, halfers and thirders disagree (Cisewski et al., 2016 ; see also Ross 2010) . Halfers predict that P (Tails) = 1/2 in both the Basic and the Plus condition, since they claim that self-locating information bears no relevance relation with the outcome of the coin toss. Instead, thirders predict that P (Tails) = 2/3 in the Basic condition, and that P (Tails) = 5/6 in the Plus condition as a function of the partition of centred possibilities.
Participants read one version of the SBP, and were asked to express their belief about the outcome of the coin toss in the situation described in one vignette. Participants' beliefs were collected on a 7-point Likert-scale ranging from 'Certain that it was Heads and not Tails' to 'Certain that it was Tails and not Heads.' Finally, participants were asked to indicate their age, sex, and level of education.
Results.
A Kruskal-Wallis test showed that each of our four manipulations had a significant effect on participants' judgment, χ 2 (3) = 28.76, p = .000. Across conditions, we also found significant differences concerning the degree of certainty that the outcome of the coin toss was Tails (ranging in 4-7, i.e. from "equally likely" to "certain"), χ 2 (3) =60. 
Study 2
Method. Study 1 revealed that participants' judgments of the SBP depended on the type of evidence available. In particular, its results are consistent with the idea that naïve reasoners acknowledge self-locating information as relevant in the SBP (Plus condition). Study 2 examined whether these results may have been affected by a focus on the coin mechanism in the question participants were asked.
A new sample of two hundred and thirty-seven participants (Mean age 34, SD = 10, male 137, female 100) was recruited from Amazon MTurk. As in Study 1, we only allowed MTurk workers with an approval rate > 95% and with a number of HITs approved > 5000 to participate in our study. Instructions and material were presented in English on the Qualtrics Survey Software.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups, and none took part in more than one experiment.
Unlike in Study 1, participants did not express their belief about the outcome of the coin toss.
Instead, participants expressed their belief about the pill they were administered in the situation they were asked to consider. Otherwise, the versions of the SBP used in this second study were identical to the versions we used in Study 1. Responses were again collected on a 7-point Likertscale and participants again provided their age, sex, and level of education. 
Discussion
Our results show that experimentally observed reasoning in the SBP does not simply fit either the halfer or the thirder analyses. The halfer's analysis is consistent with the lack of a significant difference between the Basic and No Evidence conditions, but is at odds with the finding that the Plus and Basic conditions reliably differed (recall that for the halfer one should have P(Tails) = 1/2 in both cases). The thirder's analysis, on the other hand, is consistent with the latter result, but is inconsistent with the finding that the probability of Tails is reliably judged to be higher in the Marble than in the Plus condition (for the thirder, one should have P(Tails) = 5/6 in both cases).
Because in some of the conditions the variance was relatively high, we examined whether we could distinguish a group of halfers and a group of thirders among the participants. If our participants actually included these two groups, then the pattern of responses across critical conditions like Basic and Plus should be bimodally distributed. However, we did not find indications of a bimodal distribution in any of the conditions. Furthermore, our results seem to rule out the possibility that differences in how people reason about SB do not depend on differences in how they treat self-locating information, but instead depend on different people having differing models for the type of evidence that SB will observe (cf. Cisewski et al. 2016) . If the significant difference that we found between the Basic and Plus conditions only depended on the presence of one group of halfers and one group of thirders among our participants, who would have differing models for the type of evidence that SP will observe, then the variance of the responses in the Plus condition should be higher than the variance in the Basic condition. After all, halfers should respond 1/2 in both conditions, while thirders should respond 2/3 in Basic and 5/6 in Plus. However, if there are actually two groups among our participants, then the variance in the Plus condition should also be systematically higher than the variance of the responses in the Marble condition, because, in this latter condition, both halfers and thirders agree on the 5/6 response. Yet again, this is not what we found: the variance of participants' responses did not systematically increase from the Marble to the Plus conditions. So, the hypothesis that our participants included a group of halfers and a group of thirders does not seem to account for our results.
Given that no standard theoretical analysis accounts for observed behavior, one might be tempted to complement a thirder framework with an appeal to cognitive limitations akin to those arising in other known puzzles of probabilistic reasoning. In particular, from a thirder's perspective, the SBP may seem structurally similar to the Monty Hall problem. And Monty Hall is known to invite 1/2 as a largely dominant response because of the representational and computational difficulty of the task for the unaided human mind (Krauss & Wang, 2003) . Although appealing, this remark is not sufficient to explain our results either. After all, thirders could easily see that the Marble and the Plus variants have the same mathematical structure, with the number of marbles corresponding to the number of awakenings; and so, they will provide similar judgments in both variants. However,
this is not what we found. Our participants' judgments differed significantly across the Marble and Plus condition, which suggests that our findings cannot simply be explained in terms of representational difficulty of the task like in the Monty Hall problem.
A thirder would also be unable to explain our results by relying solely on a general tendency to conservatism in probability updating, according to which people's belief updating is generally conservative relative to the predictions of Bayesian conditioning (Phillips & Edwards 1966; Edwards 1968; Fischoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1972 were structurally analogous from a general probabilistic point of view.
Consistent with our results is instead the explanation that people show a tendency to conservativism in specific settings, only with respect to specific kinds of evidence. The idea is that our participants extracted less certainty from the available self-locating evidence in comparison to the "observed" evidence of the marble in a randomly chosen box. This conservativism in belief updating with self-locating information can be further explained in a number of ways (cf., Edwards 1968). Participants could have mis-perceived the true evidential impact of self-locating information, discounting its weight more than "observed" evidence. Or, although the weight of self-locating information was perceived in a similar way as the weight of non-self-locating information, participants might have applied an adjusted combination rule to self-locating information when revising their beliefs.
Source reliability provides another factor that can explain our results in a way that is consistent with Bayesian belief update. As Corner, Harris & Hahn (2010) suggest, in situations where information is received from some source, people should not update their beliefs as much as if they had directly observed the evidence. This is because it is rare that people receive information from sources that are fully reliable; and it is even more rare that people produce themselves fully reliable information, on which they update their beliefs. Consequently, self-locating information produced by oneself could be diluted to some degree, in line with a Bayesian analysis of source reliability (Corner et al. 2010 ).
In summary, our results are consistent with a pattern of judgment that is qualitatively different from either the halfer or thirder analyses, where self-locating evidence is acknowledged as relevant but its quantitative impact is discounted significantly as compared to more standard statistical evidence. Other factors were previously shown to have such diluting effects on reasoning with evidence, such as second-order uncertainty about the values of a relevant statistical distribution (Tentori, Crupi, & Osherson, 2010) . Although "mixed" models of the SBP exist (Bostrom, 2007; Meacham 2008 ), they do not take into account this particular diluting, conservative effect involved in reasoning with self-locating information. Our results will then contribute to put analyses of the SBP, and more generally of probabilistic reasoning with selflocating information, on plausible descriptive grounds.
